INTRODUCTION
The U.S. is faced with a new strategy from our perennial Soviet adversaries. The Soviet Secretary/President Michail Gorbachev has outlined his strategy as Perestroika and Glastnost.
Gorbachev's strategy is based on restraint in Soviet international relations while opening his society to changes that will ultimately bring about a Soviet economic resurgence. Wars in the third world will continue to occur even if there is a detente between the superpowers. Major regional powers maintain and use huge armies beyond their borders. The Cubans maintained over 50,000 troops in Angola in 1988. They were opposed by the South African forces in Namibia of almost equal strength. Enough border disputes, religious fundamentalist resurgence, revolutionary zealots, historical hatreds, and ethnic squabbles exist to make wars certain throughout the world. If the superpowers disengage from the tensions of the third world, the old and new regional disputes will be solved without the controls that the superpowers rivalry placed on the warring parties.
The U.S. can join into a dialogue with the Soviet Union on opening their respective societies, but U.S. can't ignore the certainty of conflict in the third world. The spectrum of war that addresses war in the third world is called Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) . If the U.S. wants to maintain its position as a world power and protectorate of democracy then it must accept the certainty of conflict in the third world regardless of the outcome of Perestroika and Glastnost, then it must prepare a national strategy for LIC and fund the forces required to accomplish the strategy.
A great debate has taken place in the U.S. this past decade concerning the organization and utilization of U.S. power in LIC.
New Commands and organizations were established to solve U.S. problems in the LIC arena. Presidential appointed committees reviewed the problems of using discriminate deterrence in third world conflicts. But through all the review and research no clear U.S. national security strategy for LIC was published. The reason for this past lack of a national effort in LIC strategy is because no national security council level organization has existed that could define, coordinate, and publish a strateqy.
Although in 1986, Congress directed the President to create a 2 National Security Council Board for Low Intensity Conflict and Special Operations, the Board does not exist as q functioning entity. If LIC is inevitable and the U.S. remains involved in the third world, then the U.S. must create a structure that will formulate a strategy that will meet these conflicts. In order to accomplish this task, the U.S. must understand the nature of the changing Soviet threat, understand the basic U.S. national security strategy in relation to the Soviet threat, and then review the criticisms of the current problems with U.S. LIC operations. I will briefly cover these topics because they lead to the final and most important missing links in LIC strategy, the creation of a National Security Council Board for Low Intensity Conflict, its organization and responsibilities.
THE CHANGING SOVIET THREAT IN THE ERA OF GLASTNOST AND PERESTROIKA
The major area of conflict in the past four decades was in the third world. The most recent U.S. example of LIC operating in isolation from national strateqy is the U.S. involvemnnt in El Salvador. Finally, the members of the NSC board on SO/LIC must be able to communicate their ideap and strategies in a manner that will gain support of the U.S. citizens to sustain a lengthy involvement in third world conflicts.
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NSC LIC AGENDA
The agenda for the NSC board on SO/LIC must initially develop 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The United States is faced with a dynamic and changing world. 
